Strategic Patience on the Eastern Front by Maj Gen Abhi Parmar VSM (Retd)

A lot of debate is going on these days whether it was wise for India to have intervened in East Pakistan during those turbulent days of 1971. My take on the issue, both as a veteran of 1971 war and also as a student of India’s security concerns, especially in relation to its immediate neighbours. A few points below…

In hindsight, I think, India’s intervention in East Pakistan in 1971 was a strategically sound and morally compelling decision. It was a well thought through decision taken based on the geopolitical conditions as were obtaining at that time in the sub-continent.

It decisively ended a humanitarian catastrophe, neutralised a hostile two-front threat from Pakistan, and fundamentally tilted the balance of power in South Asia in India’s favour. The creation of Bangladesh removed Pakistan’s eastern military threat permanently and demonstrated India’s capacity to shape regional outcomes when its core security concerns and humanitarian principles converged. For many decades thereafter, an independent Bangladesh—despite periods of instability—largely contributed to peace on India’s eastern borders, economic integration, and regional connectivity. Events of the last five decades therefore suggests that 1971 was not a strategic miscalculation but a well analysed action, even if the dividends were uneven and occasionally strained.

Second, the present possibility of a hostile Bangladesh exploring closer alignment with Pakistan must be viewed not as a historical irony, but as a reminder that nation-states act on perceived interests rather than past gratitude. Domestic political shifts, identity politics, economic pressures, and external influence—particularly from China—can recalibrate Dhaka’s foreign posture irrespective of 1971. However, a Pakistan-Bangladesh realignment, while symbolically provocative, has limited strategic depth unless backed by sustained economic, military, and logistical capacity—which Pakistan itself currently lacks. The greater concern for India lies not in Islamabad’s influence per se, but in the creation of strategic space for extra-regional powers to exploit Bangladesh as a lever against India’s eastern flank.

Third, India’s approach should be guided by strategic patience rather than emotional reaction or coercive posturing. Heavy-handed diplomacy, public rebukes, or punitive economic signals would risk driving Bangladesh further away while reinforcing nationalist narratives hostile to India. Instead, New Delhi should quietly reinforce its comparative advantages: economic interdependence, access to markets, energy security, transit connectivity, and people-to-people ties. Simultaneously, India must strengthen intelligence cooperation, border management, and maritime surveillance in the Bay of Bengal to ensure that hostile intent does not translate into security vulnerabilities. Strategic deterrence should be firm but understated.

Finally, India should adopt a calibrated dual-track strategy: engagement without illusion and preparedness without provocation. Diplomatic channels must remain open even with unfriendly governments. It should strengthen ties with Southeast Asia, and accelerates development in its own northeastern states to reduce external leverage over them. Bangladesh should be treated as a sovereign actor free to choose its alignments—but India must make clear, privately and consistently, that active hostility or facilitation of anti-India forces will invite proportional consequences. History has come full circle, but India today is far more economically resilient, diplomatically networked, and strategically confident than in 1971. That confidence—not nostalgia or resentment—should define its response.

Having said that India has to patiently wait and watch the outcome of the forthcoming elections and thereafter the fresh policy statement of the new Government pertaining to its international relations.

Author – Maj Gen Abhi Parmar VSM (Retd), was commissioned in Infantry (The Rajput Regiment) from IMA in Dec 1969.  He retired as General Officer and was part of his battalion in the 1971 war. He has served in Deserts, J & K, Sikkim, and NE and also on various appointments in different Formation HQs and Training Establishments.  He was Director-General  Indian Golf Union (2009 – 2014). He is Chairman, “STRIVE”, Think Tank,  after retirement and pursuing his hobbies, Golf, traveling and writing.

Disclaimer: The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the organisation that he belongs to or of the STRIVE.