Joint planning centre vs theatre commands Who should lead in war ETv Bharat 03 Sep 2025 Maj Gen Harsha Kakar

https://www.etvbharat.com/en/!opinion/analysis-joint-planning-centre-vs-theatre-commands-who-should-lead-in-war-and-why-enn25090303111

Joint planning centre vs theatre commands: Who should lead in war ETv Bharat 03 Sep 2025

          Speaking at a fireside chat in Mhow, as part of ‘Ran Samwad 2025, the air chief, Air Marshal AP Singh mentioned, ‘I feel having joint planning and coordination at the apex level is what is required. If directions go from it, things will work out. We don’t actually need another structure at the lower level (implying theatre commands).’ He added, ‘disrupting everything and making one structure (theatre commands) now at this time, I do not think it is a very good idea.’

          The air force proved its primacy in Operation Sindoor, a limited operation. It played a major role in subduing Pakistan’s air power as also degrading its strategic assets, compelling it to approach New Delhi for a ceasefire. The air force, due to paucity of resources, has always believed that they cannot divide limited air assets to theatre commands and these must remain under centralized control. It believes it may not be able to employ them as at present due to blocks placed by theatre commanders.

          Under the system being proposed by the air chief, HQ IDS (Integrated Defence Staff) would establish a joint planning and coordination centre which would include the three service chiefs working in unison under the CDS. They would determine force levels to be employed and operate jointly to achieve common goals. This would enable air HQ to determine the type of aircraft it needs as also ammunition essential to meet laid down goals.

          Such a construct and levels of coordination would be dependent upon understanding between service chiefs and the CDS. This may be ideal at present but was not the same during the tenure of General Bipin Rawat, a fact well known, needing no further elaboration. Hence, there is a possibility of the system being off-tracked due to differences in perceptions and individual views.

          Operation Sindoor was launched two weeks post Pahalgam. This gave Pakistan time to deploy its resources as it expected an Indian assault, indications to which were made by political leaders. The surprise was in the manner India responded. The initial Indian response was partially flawed as it did not subdue Pakistan’s air defences while targeting its terrorist camps. However, the subsequent assault, post subduing its air defences, proved to be fatal for Pakistan.

          The gap between Pahalgam and Operation Sindoor was utilized to gather information about Pak camps, formulate plans for a counteroffensive as also prepare the strikes. This was because service HQs had not envisaged such a contingency. The entire system put in place was ad-hoc but successful for a short operation, needing close monitoring. Its effectiveness was also due to the involvement of multiple intelligence and technical agencies, largely headed by the NSA, whose inputs proved decisive.

          A theatre command on the other hand should have representatives of all these agencies as part of it, if its structure is correctly planned. The western theatre command, responsible for the Pak front would always have options to counter any misadventure. It is unlikely that it would take over a fortnight to react to such an incident. The faster the reaction, the more the impact and firmer the message. At the same time, such operations would need clearance from Joint Chief’s of Staff on its implementation, post political sanction.

          Secondly, would a similar coordination centre be as effective in war, which is the primary role of the armed forces, unlike a single service led short operation, with army operations laregly restricted to a single sector. War would not involve just air power but coordinated employment of all forces, including strike formations of the army, all of which were missing this time.

These cannot be controlled from New Delhi, where service HQs are located, apart from generalized directions. Operations are coordinated at Command levels and executed at Corps and below, based on a national objective and end state. No two service command HQs are co-located for effective and joint planning. In the current construct, the army cannot even bank on guaranteed air power resources in its operational plans as these are controlled from New Delhi and dependent on the air force’s strategic and operational plans.

The best structure in such a scenario would be theatre commands. Operation Sindoor is not the new normal on which all future operations including a prolonged war would be based. As Rajnath Singh stated at the same event, ‘In today’s era, it is very difficult to predict when a war will end.’ He added that it could stretch from months to years.

          Thirdly, why is the air HQ unwilling to accept theatre commands. Does it believe that the theatre commander would hesitate to share resources? If so, then this is farfetched. Theatre commanders also operate under the CDS and joint chiefs of staff and hence would implement all directions.  

Retaliatory actions, as in Operation Sindoor, with limited aims and objectives are vastly different and could be coordinated in the manner it was. Further, the next response by India to a Pak misadventure may not be a repeat of Operation Sindoor. Structures proposed by the air chief may then be unsuitable.

          Another regular occurrence necessitating retaliatory actions are intrusions in the northern sector. The current approach is to stall the intrusion and enter into discussion. The Indian armed forces would need to consider similar countermeasures by own forces in adjoining sectors speeding dialogue leading to resolution. While such operations would be army led, movement of additional forces from the interior would need air power. Air power would also be needed in case of escalation. This would best be controlled by theatre commands as they would be responsible for the entire front.

          As the air chief rightly mentioned, emphasis needs to also be given cyber, space, AI and electronic warfare. These organizations will all be part of theatre commands and far more closely integrated, rather than at the levels of service HQs.

          It was also stated by the air chief that theatre commands are a western concept and should not be aped. While the term may be western, the commands are being structured to Indian needs. The current structure of the armed forces, including most terminology, traditions and customs, are also copied from the British with few modifications, flowing from lessons and changing concepts of war. Similarly, theatre commands need to be tailor-made to meet Indian threats. If needed, a new terminology could also be coined.

The fact is that strategic and operational plans encompassing all three services, harnessing their core strengths to achieve national objectives is paramount. This can only be through theatre commands rather than centralized control. If centralized control was the answer, then why does the air force have seven commands? Air HQs should be sufficient. It is time the armed forces set aside their personal differences for the national good.