Operation Sindoor Will Be Studied by Military Strategists for Years to Come ETv Bharat 12 Jun 2025 Maj Gen Harsha Kakar

https://www.etvbharat.com/en/!opinion/post-operation-sindoor-india-and-pakistan-indian-armed-forces-military-enn25061202502

Operation Sindoor Will Be Studied by Military Strategists for Years to Come ETv Bharat 12 Jun 2025

The dust has settled along the LoC and routine procedures have begun between India and Pakistan, including the comic show at Attari. In Pakistan all is normal, no one questions losses incurred in the short conflict while their DGISPR continues pushing narratives of victory despite massive losses. The concentration of the nation has shifted to Baluchistan where, desperate to project Indian support to the movement, the press has begun terming Baloch freedom fighters as ‘Indian sponsored proxies.’

In India, the BJP has begun exploiting Operation Sindoor for political gains in forthcoming elections, compelling the opposition to seek answers on losses, largely aircraft, while demanding a joint parliament session and a review committee akin to Kargil. Political games will continue, till something more news-catching emerges. The armed forces are silent as they normally are, looking ahead.

However, it is time to take stock and plan. Pahalgam was neither the first major terrorist attack nor will it be the last. Post the cross-border strike in 2016, there was no major terrorist incident for three years, post Balakote for six and post Sindoor, anybody’s guess. Holding the IWT in abeyance may have some additional impact on the Pak army, especially if the nation’s agriculture output is impacted, however unknown for how long.

Added are huge financial and asset losses to Pakistan which will take some time for them to recreate. Terrorist monsters that Pak has raised can be curbed but not eradicated as fundamentalism runs high. Till then, Pak will bide its time, continue with low grade terrorism in Kashmir. It can never let the world forget that Kashmir remains disputed.

PM Modi’s new redlines will dictate nature of future operations, in case of a major terrorist strike. He had stated, ‘If there is a terror attack on India, we will hit back. We will take stern action at every place from where the roots of terror spring forth. India will not accept any nuclear blackmail… We won’t see the government that sponsors terror and terror outfits as different.’ This implies that unlike Operation Sindoor, India will simultaneously engage military and terrorist targets. This will eradicate the risk to our aircraft which are involved in initial engagements. 

Added are lessons which flowed from the current operation. These include launching aerial strikes without subduing enemy’s air defence can have consequences as also the failure to plan, build and counter the enemy’s narratives. While the first lesson was overcome immediately thereafter, the second remains a weakness even currently. This will need a dedicated vertical under the CDS coordinating between the three services and other government agencies. There were also gaps in strategic intelligence, which will need to be addressed.

There were positives too, which override the negatives. The planning and execution was flawless. The synergy, coordination and sharing of resources indicate that the Indian armed forces are at the right stage for introducing theatre commands. The aim of the operation was achieved and a nuclear power brought to its knees in under 4 days. India displayed that there is space below nuclear threshold for conventional conflicts with limited aims.

There was no collateral damage, despite many targets being surrounded by residential dwelling and mosques. It was a display of professionalism, accuracy, right selection of vectors and training. Losses, if any, should be ignored based on success and achievement of aims. Indian defence industry proved it has come of age and produces far more reliable products than China or Turkey. The operation will be studied by military strategists for years to come.   

The future will be different. If China provided Pak with technical support, including monitoring by satellites and its AWACS this time, the next conflict would involve much more backing, after all both have just one aim, let India down. Grey Zone warfare, always ongoing, would increase in tempo. The battlefield would be far more transparent and any movement of major weapon systems including long range vectors and aircraft would be known real time. Surprise may not be easy to achieve, unless it involves out of the box planning.

No previous operation can be repeated as the enemy would be expecting something similar or a variant. Added is the fact that technology will dominate the battlefield of the future. As the CDS stated in the Shangri La dialogue, ‘Modern warfare is undergoing a complex convergence — of tactics, domains (land, air, sea, cyber and space), timeframes and strategies. This evolution demands a shift away from large static platforms toward flexible, deceptive strategies. Network-centric warfare, where integration and automation across domains are critical, is becoming the new norm.’

What do we need to do now? We must begin with the assumption that there will be another major terrorist strike at some stage. It is not the question of ‘if’ but ‘when.’ Hence, we need to be prepared to counter it. The government can never let the terrorist, backed by Pakistan, gain the upper hand. Options to obtain desired outcomes must constantly be reevaluated. Futuristic weapon systems, ammunition and means of delivery for all three services must be on the pipeline.

This implies an enhanced defence budget in the coming years as also higher funding for R and D. India cannot be import oriented for technology upgrades. Secondly, enhancing domestic production capacities, such that we do not look for imports to overcome domestic shortfalls. Shortages in airpower cannot remain for decades. Either HAL enhances its production capacities or the government moves for a one-time import or involves the private sector to over this shortcoming.

Thirdly, greater civil-military fusion. The industry, academia and DRDO need to have regular interactions with the armed forces. Nature of future warfare, possible types of weapon systems including their desired capabilities need to be shared so that they begin development. Funding from the government and hand-holding by the forces is essential for domestic industry.

Fourthly is structural changes. Theatre commands need to be given priority in their raising. In addition, as far as the army is concerned, the Ladakh sector must be shifted from Northern Command to Central command, thereby leaving Northern to concentrate on a 1.5 front conflict, which implies Pakistan and terrorism. Both Pakistan and terrorism will remain ‘irritants’ as long as China backs them. Finally, HQ IDS must work towards creating a vertical for countering fake narratives.

We must begin looking at the future now since capabilities take time to develop and absorb.