Trust deficit remains in India-China ties The Statesman 31 Dec 2024 Maj Gen Harsha Kakar

https://epaper.thestatesman.com/3958459/Kolkata-The-Statesman/31ST-DECEMBER-2024#page/7/2

Trust deficit remains in India-China ties The Statesman 31 Dec 2024
An agreement on resolving the standoff in Ladakh was reached on 21st Oct, just prior to the BRICS summit in Kazan, Russia, paving the way for a PM Modi-Xi Jinping dialogue at the venue. The Chinese readout of the meeting mentioned, ‘President Xi stressed that China-India relations are essentially a question of how the two large developing countries and neighbours, each with a 1.4-billion-strong population, treat each other.’
It added, ‘The two sides agreed to make good use of the Special Representatives (SR) mechanism on the China-India boundary question, ensure peace and tranquillity in border areas, and find a fair and reasonable settlement.’ Both sides had by then pulled back to their original positions and agreed on recommencement of coordinated patrolling, which has since been underway. In other locations where disengagement has already taken place, buffer zones remain, implying that a final resolution is still some distance away.
For China, which waded in four years ago, to withdraw to its pre-Galwan deployment has been considered by some as a victory for India. This is based on the fact that China failed to change status quo of the LAC as also India refused to bend. This may not be a true assessment.
China utilized this period of standoff to enhance its infrastructure, increasing its ability to repeat similar intrusions. In all probability, the Chinese were sending a message that they possess the power to ignite the border at will. The current pullback is not the end but possibly a pause before another incident, unless India changes its approach towards countering the Chinese. This implies that India, in the future, must adopt a quid quo pro approach, including intruding in a similar manner.
The meeting between the leaders was followed by an interaction between the two SRs the Indian National Security Advisor, Ajit Doval, and the Chinese Foreign Minister, Wang Yi. These discussions led to announcement of resumption of the Kailash Mansarovar Yatra, data sharing on trans-border rivers and re-commencement of border trade at Nathu La in Sikkim. Move forward on resolving the LAC will be a slow process.
Chinese intrusions and standoffs have occurred at regular intervals, normally coinciding with events or visits. Till Galwan, standoffs were marked by both sides holding their positions with multilingual placards demanding the other withdraw. Troops stayed in place and ultimately both sides pulled back, normally after discussions at next higher levels.
Galwan was the first violent incident followed by Yangtze in Dec 2022. However, there was no firing in either incident. Evidently, the days of placards are over and violence will guide future confrontations, albeit with hand held weapons. Unless a resolution on the LAC emerges, these fisticuffs could turn into firing incidents, escalating the LAC possibly on similar lines as the LOC with Pakistan.
Despite a pull-back and restoration of patrolling, following high level meetings, a major trust deficit continues to exist. India hesitates to term the relationship normal, instead refers to it as ‘stable but sensitive,’ giving the impression that normalcy which existed pre-2020 is still some distance away. With continued presence of additional forces and existence of buffer zones, threats remain.
The fact remains that India and China are rivals in Asia and while there may be peace along the borders, there will always be an underplay of tensions, amidst the competition. Both nations are seeking to expand their region of influence. While China has been making inroads into South Asia, India has been doing the same in countries in conflict with China. Both nations are also battling for leadership of the global South.
The current détente suits both nations for the moment. China is feeling western pressures with increased tariffs on its products, denial of dual use technology and enhanced military support to Taiwan. It needs the Indian market more than ever for its economy to survive. The return of Trump to the White House could add to diplomatic and economic pressures. Further, China cannot afford India moving closer to the US.
India is seeking to expand its global footprint and for that to happen it cannot be seen to be surrendering to China. Further, in South Asia, India backing down and accepting Chinese presence on its soil, would open doors for greater Chinese influence with nations working to resolve their border differences with China, ignoring India’s concerns. India also needs Chinese technology and investments. Growing bilateral trade, with the deficit favouring China implies that India’s dependence on China is nowhere near reducing.
The issue at hand is whether this détente can be expected to prolong. Chinese intent appears to be to regain Taiwan as its priority rather than engage with India militarily. It is aware that the Indian armed forces are capable and can withstand Chinese pressures. Hence, what would both nations be seeking at the moment.
India would be seeking to continue discussions to convert the LAC into a marked LOC, akin to its border with Pakistan, until a permanent resolution is arrived at. Once demarcated, chances of intrusions would reduce. The question is whether China would be willing. For China, its current intent would be to keep India in good humour while it concentrates on its other problems including handling the US, reinvigorating its economy and shifting focus to regaining control over Taiwan.
It remains hopeful that at some stage it can resolve Taiwan politically, post which it could shift focus to the Indian border. Chinese military power is being developed to counter the US rather than India, while Indian military power is intended to counter China. Simultaneously, China would hope that the India-US strategic relationship suffers a setback which would work to its benefit.
At the end of the day leaders of both nations made strategic errors. The Indian leadership trusted the Chinese, despite Doklam, and never expected Beijing to act the way it did, an act which surprised it. Xi Jinping, on his part, was unprepared for India’s response, determination not to bow down and relentless pursuit for ultimate withdrawal.
The agreement and pull back has been a face-saving for both nations. Will this translate into a resolution along the LAC or will it be just another stop gap before the Chinese make another attempt is to be seen.