Countering China along the LAC Raksha Anirveda 11 Nov 2026
Countering China along the LAC Raksha Anirveda 11 Nov 2026
Indo-China ties are complex. Additional deployment of troops along the LAC is now a new normal. While economic ties are growing and diplomatic engagements increase, tension along borders remains high. This largely flows from mistrust between the two sides. It has always been China which has taken the first negative step and India has responded firmly, forcing the PLA to back down.
India has repeatedly been stating that ‘maintenance of peace and tranquillity in border areas is essential for overall development of bilateral relations.’ China believes that both sides should ‘place the boundary question in its proper context within the overall bilateral relationship, and move forward steadily.’ Both approaches are different, one primarily seeks peace, the other considers it secondary.
There are multiple mechanisms at work attempting to resolve the border dispute. These include the Special Representative (SR) level talks, the WMCC (Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on India–China Border Affairs) and military talks at different levels. In the last round of SR talks, two additional hot lines and meeting points were agreed to, in addition to five already existing.
Working behind the scenes throughout is the 1975 founded China Study Group. This high-level body of experts monitors current scenarios, determines nature of infrastructure to be developed and helps prepare government representatives on negotiations. It also assesses every discussion and recommends future actions.
Post strong response by India in Eastern Ladakh, including enhanced deployment, Chinese emphasis has shifted towards Central and Eastern sectors. Standoffs has been increasing in Arunachal, where China appears to be defining its claim lines. Every Chinese action begins with an intrusion, which is countered and they are forced to step back. The Central Sector too will face the same.
The message flowing from China is that an un-demarcated border will be exploited. Simultaneously, they insist that they are acting within parameters of existing agreements and safeguarding their territorial integrity. In the late nineties and early 2000’s Some attempts were made to exchange maps, to move towards demarcation of borders but that too died down.
In the last round of SR talks in August, China proposed an ‘early harvest’ of resolving the border. The statement mentioned, ‘advance discussions on an Early and Substantial Harvest of boundary delimitation and Border Management.’ Though no region was specifically mentioned, it appears that China was hinting at settling the Sikkim boundary between the two nations because they claim that the border had already been accepted in the 1890 convention between ‘Britain and China.’ It could also imply the Middle Sector (Uttarakhand) as there are very few disagreements in this region.
India has been hesitant to accept this for two reasons. Firstly, in a complete settlement, concessions in one sector could be offered for a settlement in another. Secondly, Sikkim is close to where the Doklam standoff occurred in 2017. In case Sikkim is settled, it would open doors for China to resolve Doklam in their favour in direct negotiations with Bhutan. However, even in this proposal a lot needs to be agreed prior to it even beginning to see the light of day.
Simultaneously, both sides have been giving new names for places in Arunachal. While China gives Mandarin translation for select locations in Arunachal, India provides historical names. Both disagree with the other’s action, claiming they possess the sole right to do so. India’s announcement of historical names for 27 places came a day after the WMCC meeting in Delhi. Some of the places identified by India are known for standoffs, including two recent ones. The government must insist that Indian media strictly adheres to names laid down by the Survey of India in its maps, thereby making these names permanent.
Grey Zone warfare, including supporting internal dissent as also information warfare by circulating fake videos is on the rise from the Chinese. These videos, timed with standoffs depict loss of territory as also surrender of soldiers, all of which are false. The Chinese aim is to damage reputation of the Indian armed forces while enhancing pressure on the government for its failure to defend the nation. Alongside is pushing narratives that India’s global partnerships will not benefit the nation in conflict. These are exploited by anti-government groups within the country.
Despite disagreements between Delhi and Beijing, there are positives. Trade continues, tilted heavily in favour of China as India needs Chinese products, technology and investments. Initiatives such as Kailash Manasarovar Yatra, participation in the BRICS summit are other positive indicators. Meanwhile, China continues to place India specific export curbs on machinery essential for the country’s infrastructure development. Despite promises to lift curbs, these remain. While China does seek tranquillity along the borders, it appears in no hurry to move towards resolution. It appears fixated on keeping the border tense.
While China has close relations with Pakistan, provides it with technology, satellite inputs as also weapons and equipment, its recent exercise with Pak termed as Karakoram 2026, does signal growing military cooperation. It is also enhancing relations with Bangladesh and Nepal, exploiting Indian fault lines.
In this scenario, what should be India’s approach. While talks linger, development of infrastructure along the northern borders must continue. India is dependent on exterior lines of communication, which impact pace of mobilization, viz-a-viz China. Developing inter-valley communication, alongside underground facilities to cater for changing nature of warfare is essential. Simultaneous is development of military capabilities, including surveillance, to meet demands of future warfare.
India needs to enhance its ability to counter disinformation flowing from China. The same must be identified and disseminated by the widest possible means. New Delhi must look at reducing its economic and raw material dependence on China by expanding its options. Currently, whenever China places blocks on exports, India is impacted. It cannot continue being held to ransom.
As China ventures into India’s neighbourhood, Delhi has begun doing the same in SE Asia. India’s sale of weapon systems to nation’s facing territorial disputes with China is a positive action. It must continue. India must also look to partner nations which are in conflict with China, as this relationship would be more reliable than with powers like the US, which could be accommodating to China. Such ties could also cause discomfort in Beijing.
Finally, India must not rush into negotiations for resolution under ‘early harvest.’ It should be across the board or nothing. We are in no hurry and should not dance to their tunes.