Some positives from India-China talks The Statesman 01 Sept 2026
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https://epaper.thestatesman.com/4193850/Delhi-The-Statesman/01-09-2026
Some positives from India-China talks The Statesman 01 Sept 2026
Indian NSA, Ajit Doval, held the 25th round of Special Representative (SR) talks with his counterpart, Chinese foreign minister, Wang Yi, in Beijing last week. The talks came about a month prior to the BRICS summit, which Chinese President Xi Jinping is scheduled to attend, though confirmation is yet to be received. Meanwhile an advanced delegation from China is in New Delhi, working on hotel arrangements and security protocol for Xi. This will be Xi’s first visit post the Galwan clash. He had last visited India in 2019.
The SR talks were held shortly after India released its own list of names for places in Arunachal Pradesh, to which China objected. It does appear that the Chinese tended to downplay the impact of the Indian action, though aware that it challenges their claims on Arunachal and could spread to other sectors.
It also appears that the two sides are attempting to stabilize ties, despite differences over border alignment and regional security. It was for this reason that the word ‘delimitation’ was used in the joint statement, issued 24 hours after the meeting. The terms in use earlier were border management or disengagement. These implied short-term management, but delimitation indicates the intent to move towards a permanent settlement.
The meeting led to the issuance of ‘eight points of outcomes and consensus.’ Amongst the eight, a few remain significant. The first is continuing discussions on ‘Early and Substantial Harvest of boundary delimitation and Border Management.’ This implies resolving border issues region by region, rather than complete. Maps had been exchanged on the Middle Sector, but further movement was stalled. India had for long been against partial border settlement but appears to have accepted this approach. This was first discussed positively by both sides in a similar meeting in Aug last year.
It also added that an Expert Group on Boundary Delimitation and Working Group on Border Management will have to first agree on respective terms of reference. While the process would still be slow, it is a positive trend. The first two regions which could come under resolution would be Sikkim and the Central Sector, comprising of Uttarakhand and Himachal, where differing claims are minimum.
Two additional meeting points as also hot lines, one each for the Eastern and Central sector were agreed upon. They also announced that any ‘situation on the ground’ would be addressed through existing diplomatic and military channels. These channels include the Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination, local commander‑level meetings etc. The intent appears to keep the situation along the borders stable. The selected locations for meeting points should be accessible to both sides by proper roads as also on or close to the border. Final names will be released once accepted by both sides.
Another aspect was agreeing to hold the next meeting of the Expert-Level Mechanism on Trans-border Rivers in September this year. This is aimed at maintaining communication on issues including sharing hydrological data. This particularly impacts the Brahmaputra flowing from Tibet. India’s concerns stem from flood management and implications from China’s construction of major hydropower projects in the upper basins. Timely data is crucial for disaster preparedness and water security.
Simultaneously, there has been an increase in numbers attending the Kailash Manasarovar Yatra as also three additional trading points have been opened. The two sides have also moved forward in a number of spheres. India has permitted investors from countries bordering India to acquire upto 10% non-controlling stake in all, less restricted sectors. Tourist visas and direct flights have also resumed. Visas for journalists remains a pending issue.
However, distrust continues. Differences in claim lines, largely in Arunachal and Ladakh result occasionally in prolonged standoffs as happened in July this year. Though there have been no clashes since Yangtze in Dec 2022, the same could occur, unless checked. Additional hotlines and meeting points could possibly diffuse the scenario before it escalates.
On its part, China is concerned about India’s growing ties with Japan, especially the recently inked memorandum on maritime security cooperation, coming when China-Japan ties are sliding. Added is India’s membership of the QUAD, which China has always believed was aimed at it. It is India which is against its militarization. With US focus shifting, QUAD currently is on low key.
China’s open support to Pakistan, as was evident in Operation Sindoor last year, is an indicator that while it may ‘stabilize’ its border with India, it will exploit Pakistan as a proxy. It will also continue to use Pakistan as a testing ground for its military products. The other concern is the growing technological gap between India and China in almost all fields, largely military. This will impact India’s defence preparedness.
To display positivity and create a congenial atmosphere, the wording in the joint statement included, ‘The two sides agreed to strengthen exchanges and cooperation in border trade, pilgrimage and other areas, with the view to work together to create an atmosphere featuring dialogue, peace, consultation and cooperation in the border areas.’
The timing of SR talks are also very relevant. The forthcoming BRICS summit is important for multiple reasons and hence it was essential for India and China to display unity. Firstly, India will be handing over the baton for the next summit to China, which will assume the presidency from 01 Jan 2027. If Xi does not attend in Delhi, Modi might hesitate next year. Secondly, the summit is at a time when Trump is increasing his economic measures against countries trading with Iran and Russia. India and China are two nations in Trump’s crosshairs.
Thirdly, it is also time for BRICS to send the right message to the US. The presence of the Iranian and Russian Presidents, Masoud Pezeshkian and Vladimir Putin, at the summit would indicate that the grouping has unity. Xi missing would display disunity within the BRICS. Fourthly, major powers attending the summit would highlight close cooperation amongst the leaders of the global South. Finally, what remains crucial is India’s diplomatic heft to issue a joint declaration at the end of the BRICS summit.
The Doval-Xi summit was also positively projected in Chinese media conveying that China is seeking far more than just border management. It is hoping that high-level communication channels between India and China continue. The next step to watch in the process is the Xi-Modi summit. What flows from it would convey future direction of relations between the two sides.




